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Abstract 
[Excerpt] The labor movement has hurt itself in recent years with a childish tendency to elevate tactical 
questions to the level of principles. And nowhere more than the "principle" of militancy versus cooperation 
and participation. 
These are tactics. Their use or rejection is not a decision that should be decided by some a priori 
considerations of ideological purity or unity of interest between labor and management, but by what will 
work in a given situation—particulars of condition, time and place. 
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For Will Rogers it was people. Personally, I've never met a tactic 
I didn't like. Only tactics that didn't work. 
The labor movement has hurt itself in recent years with a 
childish tendency to elevate tactical questions to the level of 
principles. And nowhere more than the "principle" of militancy 
versus cooperation and participation. 
These are tactics. Their use or rejection is not a decision that 
should be decided by some a priori considerations of ideological 
purity or unity of interest between labor and management, but 
by what will work in a given situation—particulars of condition, 
time and place. 
Most opponents and supporters of the concept of worker parti-
cipation, on the other hand, generalize about "good" and "bad" 
tactics on the basis of a narrow set of examples. They ignore the 
particularities of the examples that make a given tactic work or 
fail in that situation. 
In some workplaces worker participation is a management 
initiative whose real aim is undermining the Union as a means 
to cost cutting and greater control. These are the cases from which 
Mike Parker and others try to generalize rules dictating opposi-
tion to the concept. 
Then you have the failing industrial workplaces where manage-
ment's principal aim is cost cutting with union-busting a secondary 
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consideration. This is the scenario on which Banks and Metzgar 
base their model. 
Neither scenario is anything like universal. And yet neither set 
of writers limit the application of their discussions to specific fact 
patterns. 
Neither deals, for example, with a situation where there is no 
management initiative for cost cutting, where worker participation 
is a union initiative arising from a union agenda; or one where 
management already dominates workers and union. 
Neither deals with the public sector where the absence of the 
profit motive provides a different basis for cooperating to serve 
the public; where public exposure is particularly effective: easy 
access to the media (everything we do is news) and public officials 
as key decision-makers, equally susceptible to public pressure and 
to the opportunity to play hero by taking on an unpopular public 
agency. 
That was the situation at SEPTA, the Philadelphia transit system, 
when our rank-and-file ticket took over TWU Local 234 in 1983. 
Management had no reason to change anything. The SEPTA Board 
Chairman bragged the time had come "to kick labor in the gut." 
Militancy was obviously the order of the day and the Union 
lashed out with public exposure on safety; harassment and ineffi-
ciencies; massive legal filings; and selected job actions. 
Cooperation as a Union Tactic 
But militancy alone will not suffice. 
First, the public can get awfully tired of pitched battles that 
disrupt their service. Making cooperation our issue gave us the 
Moral High Ground. We were the guys who really cared about 
the public. 
Second, pitched battles are often suicidal. With management's 
superior resources they have the advantage when they know 
where and how we're coming at them. 
Our wins are like the French and Indians against the Bri t ish-
bleeding to death a stronger enemy that can't find an easy target. 
We're strongest when the company doesn't know how to prepare 
against us. Mixing militancy with attempts to establish coopera-
tion keeps them off balance. 
This is not a tactic to be rejected on the basis of a priori principles 
or some romantic fascination with big confrontations. The 
business of the labor movement is not fighting battles, but 
winning—whatever it takes. 
"To fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme 
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excellence," advises the Chinese military tactician Sun T^u. 
"Supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance 
without fighting." 
The tactic of cooperation may be better understood under its 
other name—labor peace. This is what we have to trade: give us 
what we want and we'll let you get on with business. 
Cooperation and Workers' Participation 
Participation in management is one form cooperation can take. 
Banks and Metzgar are right not to reject it out of hand. And their 
distinction between cooperation and participation is useful. 
But the worker participation they envision, pure and untouched 
by "cooperationism," is curiously abstracted from the real world 
where QWLs, etc. are a blend of both. While the union forces must 
understand the difference, worker participation shorn of its 
cooperative rhetoric misses real opportunities. 
Management will not willingly acquiesce to a form of partici-
pation that empowers unions with some control over the 
workplace. 
In Philadelphia, going on the offensive around "Labor-
Management Cooperation" enabled us to trap them with their own 
rhetoric. Especially where the public is a player, it is much harder 
for management to reject the Union's offer of "cooperation" than 
"participation." 
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Promoting participation in management as the desired form of 
that cooperation gave us a handle on more worker control of the 
workplace by penetrating the legal barrier of "management rights" 
and extending our reach into otherwise unapproachable terrain. 
(When the process at SEPTA was finally codified, it included the 
following: "Labor and management will participate in joint 
decision making on how the work is organized and decisions 
implemented!') 
Finally, we can't forget that at the end we have to negotiate their 
surrender. Just beating their brains in prolongs the bloodletting. 
But, worse, it does nothing to prepare them for the peace treaty. 
Seizing cooperation-participation as our issue permitted us to begin 
defining the terms of the surrender. 
Key One: Collective Bargaining 
The key to using participation in the workers' interest is under-
standing its nature. 
In fact, it is not outside of collective bargaining as management 
consultants claim. It is not just like collective bargaining, as Banks 
and Metzgar have it. It is collective bargaining. Nothing more nor 
less. It is, to paraphrase von Clauswitz, the continuation of 
collective bargaining by other means. 
Management comes to the "table" with things it wants. Labor 
had better do the same. Management gets something out of the 
process and the Union must make certain that what it gets in 
return is worth the trade. 
The mission of a union-empowering worker participation 
program is not, as Banks and Metzgar claim, "to improve the 
economic prospects of an enterprise in order to preserve and 
enhance workers' wages and standards" except, perhaps, in the 
concrete conditions of a failing industrial enterprise. 
The point is not to make the best of a bad situation by getting 
some union-empowerment and job security in return for whatever 
cost-cutting concessions are necessary. Like any other collective 
bargaining, the point is to get as much as we can for as little as 
we can manage. At SEPTA specific objectives included reduction 
in discipline, getting rid of specific practices or bosses, rewritten 
job descriptions, a 4-day work week alternative. 
Nor do you have to necessarily give up anything that matters. 
The model deal, as in all collective bargaining, is trading labor 
peace for all the economic gains and control we want. Sometimes 
we have to settle for less. 
Union gains from worker participation depend on how much 
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union militancy has made labor peace worth to the company. 
In Philadelphia, that was a great deal. Every issue that arose, 
we would "hold out our hand," offer cooperation. When they 
refused, we would explain the consequences of their refusal: 
media exposure, legislative investigation, civil lawsuits, etc. If they 
didn't respond to the "treat" (cooperation), we'd smack them 
around with something that hurt until they were trained—like a 
dog—to give us things we wanted in return for not getting hit. 
Far from walling off the participation program from collective 
bargaining, at SEPTA the final product included a statement that 
"neither party gives up, by their participation in the New Route 
Program, any existing rights under the labor agreement, including 
rights under past practice. This does not, however, preclude the 
parties from negotiating contract changes as a result of discussions 
undertaken in the program," It certainly did not. 
Negotiating Through the "New Route" Program 
What advantages did we gain by negotiating through the New 
Route program? 
Trapped by their own rhetoric of cooperation and common 
interest, management could not refuse to discuss nonmandatory 
subjects of bargaining like frequency and routing of service and 
other issues affecting the "product." They were forced to share 
information and data with the Union which exposed even more 
problems and provided more leverage. 
Unable to hide behind "that's none of your business," managers 
were increasingly forced to justify policies and defend them to 
the Union. Many were exposed as incompetent. Others, having 
to come up with good reasons for doing something, quickly found 
it easier to follow the Union's suggestion when there was no good 
reason not to. 
The process also enabled the Union to play management 
politics—one level of management against another. Managers 
suddenly became interested in resolving disputes with the Union 
before they had to do so under scrutiny of their bosses. Top 
management, meanwhile, began deflecting criticism downward, 
blaming subordinates, strengthening their desire to settle with the 
Union at lower levels. 
Even in collective bargaining for a new labor agreement we 
frequently found it profitable to shift the discussions to a New 
Route committee where traditional bargaining rules did not apply. 
The new contract expanded one small Labor-Management 
Safety Committee into safety committees in each of 20 locations 
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(with paid time off, authority, resources, etc.). At one point SEPTA 
negotiators were dug in that rank-and-file representatives be 
volunteers rather than selected by the Union. We made the 
committees part of the "New Route," then reminded them of the 
LMC guidelines: "All Union representatives at each level will be 
selected by the Union." End of discussion. 
A second example involved the writing of new job descriptions. 
At SEPTA a disastrous 1979 agreement had allowed the company 
to combine many previously separate jobs. Even though most 
workers only did a few of the tasks in a given job description, it 
was an obstacle to advancement, and the freedom to assign 
unfamiliar tasks was used as a weapon by managers. Industrial 
relations managers who had negotiated this in 1979 resisted all 
efforts to correct the abuses. 
By kicking the discussions over into New Route subcommittees 
we were able to bypass the hard-liners. Managers, union and rank 
and file from the affected locations were able to focus the discus-
sions on the real needs of the work. New jobs were created (e.g., 
Locksmith, Carpenter and Roofer instead of the old three-way 
combination) with clear descriptions and seniority protections. 
Of course, management can leave the process at any time. But 
that itself provides a Union victory. Even in their worst days 
SEPTA management never had the nerve to give the Union this 
kind of propaganda weapon. Even so, the combination of militant 
public exposure with cooperation-participation played a central 
role in the Union's successful campaign to remove the Board 
Chairman, the General Manager and the Head of Operations. 
Key Two: Maintaining Union independence 
The process only works if the Union maintains its independence. 
All labor participants are named by the Union. Independent 
discussions between Union leaders and rank-and-file establish 
Union goals and a Union agenda for each meeting (as manage-
ment establishes theirs). In addition to any joint training, all Union 
appointees are given separate training on the Union agenda and 
their role as representatives of the Union. 
In this the Banks-Metzgar model is a good one. In other respects 
it is still burdened by too many a priori rules. They argue against 
"neutral" consultants. We found PALM, an organization run 
jointly by the AFL-CIO and the Chamber of Commerce, very 
useful. A genuine third party reporting on the process to outsiders, 
they made it very difficult for management to deviate from their 
rhetoric. 
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Rank-and-File Participation 
Banks and Metzgar suggest "the structural exclusion of manage-
ment from a direct relationship with the rank and file." At SEPTA 
the TWU saw face-to-face rank-and-file participation as a strength 
of the process. 
Their discussion demonstrates the need for Union independence 
within the process. But that is a separate question from excluding 
the rank and file from the face-to-face participation process with 
management. And there is no real justification for this exclusion 
in the examples cited. 
To hide members' knowledge from the boss? There is no place 
in the Pest Control "example" where knowledge is withheld; the 
end product is brought to management anyway. And rank-and-
file workers, prepped beforehand, can keep any secret their leaders 
can. 
To let the Union retain "exclusive access" to its constituency? 
Since when can't management talk to workers any time they want? 
As long as the rank-and-file participates in researching questions 
and making decisions first, there is no reason to exclude them. 
And there are very good reasons to include them. 
Empowerment—who are we trying to empower if not the rank 
and file? They need preparation and leadership, not exclusion. 
The concrete information on which Union leadership acts comes 
from the rank and file. It is frequently more effective coming from 
the rank and file directly. 
It is one thing for management to have to explain themselves 
to Union leaders. It is another watching some boss having to justify 
himself to the workers he supervises. Nothing is more effective. 
Nothing more empowering. 
Who Wins? 
Once forced into this process and constrained by it, management 
loses many of its best weapons. Forcing management to share real 
information and rationally justify policies fundamentally changes 
the labor-management dynamic. 
Control of the workplace moves toward whoever best 
understands the participation process and the operations of the 
workplace. It is our job to make sure that is us. • 
